Spotlight on Excessive Government Secrecy

As set forth in our Declaration of Independence, in order for our nation's citizens to provide the consent upon which our government is based, it must be an informed consent.

Thursday, August 13, 2009

How to Achieve 90% Reduction -- Step 2: No More Classifed Ham Sandwiches

The other day, I set forth a vision in which President Obama directs that the amount of information classified by our government be reduced by 90% by the end of his current administration. Yesterday I wrote about the first step in achieving such a goal -- prohibiting the application of the 'Tootsie Pop" theory. Today, I want to start by referring to the old adage about prosecutors and ham sandwiches and point out that in a similar manner, based upon today's exceedingly broad and almost nonexistent classification standards, any classifier worth his or her salt could classify a ham sandwich.

The classification standards as set forth in the current executive order are rather straight forward; specifically, Section 1.1(a)(4) states:

the original classification authority determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism, and the original classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage.

The current standard is exceedingly broad in order to allow the agencies to apply discretion and judgment in making classification decisions. Based upon my experience, the problem lies in that agencies are more than willing to embrace the discretion yet very rarely apply the judgment. Accordingly, in order to reduce by 90% the amount of information classified, a new executive order must apply the judgment on the agencies' behalf.

Specifically, as a minimum, a new classification standard must include the following elements:

1. The unauthorized disclosure of the information must be expected to result in at least serious damage to the national security (i.e. no more CONFIDENTIAL information).

2. The damage must be demonstrable; i.e. it has to be more than hypothetical and more than "we don't know and want to err on the side of caution" which is the basis, for example of the "mosaic theory." Furthermore, it must be demonstrable at the time of original classification.

3. The original classifier must assess what damage could occur to the national security should the information be withheld and certify that he or she has determined that the damage from disclosing the information exceeds the damage from withholding.

4. Finally, the standard must provide a detailed litany of the types of information that is classifiable, the types of information for which classification is prohibited, along with the direction that if an agency has information that does not fit into any of the examples, they must first seek the authorization of the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office prior to assigning classification (although provisional classification would be permissible when time is of the essence).

At the very least, a standard such as above would require that classification be a deliberate, not reflexive decision. It would also subject each classification decision to an independent review and assessment, something which is exceedingly difficult today since the current standard entails a great deal of agency discretion. For example, I do not recall the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP) ever overturning an agency classification decision that was less than 25 years old (i.e. subject to the current standard outlined above). That in and of itself says it all. Under today's "standard" it is almost impossible to be second guessed.

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